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THE DEMISE OF THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT AS A 
GUARANTOR OF RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM 
IV AN E. BODENSTEINER* 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; ... 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
While the free exercise clause obviously is designed to protect 
religious freedom, it is generally understood that the establishment 
clause is a "co-guarantor" of religious freedom because any "state-
created orthodoxy puts at grave risk that freedom of belief and 
conscience which are the sole assurance that religious faith is real, not 
imposed. "2 Assuming the two clauses were intended to be 
complementary in protecting religious freedom, there is tension 
between them because government efforts to promote free exercise 
* Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. B.A. 1965, Loras 
College; J.D. 1968, University ofNotre Dame. 
1. U.S. Const. amend. I. 
2. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992); see also Sch. Dist. of Abington 
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 232 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The 
inclusion of both restraints upon the power of Congress to legislate concerning 
religious matters shows unmistakably that the Framers of the First Amendment were 
not content to rest the protection of religious liberty exclusively upon either clause."); 
compare Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 679 (2002) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (questioning whether the establishment clause should be applied to the 
states because they should be allowed to "pass laws that include or touch on religious 
matters so long as these laws do not impede free exercise rights or any other individual 
religious liberty interest"). 
415 
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might appear to be an impermissible establishment of religion, while 
efforts to avoid the establishment of religion might be perceived as 
denying the free exercise of religion. For example, if government 
creates an exemption to a rule solely for religion, it may violate the 
establishment clause; and if government fails to create such an 
exemption, then it arguably interferes with free exercise. 3 
Assuming that protecting religious freedom is the primary goal of 
the religion clauses, several recent Supreme Court decisions prevent 
these clauses from achieving this goal for individuals whose religious 
beliefs are not in the mainstream. The point of this article is to show 
that the religion clauses in the First Amendment no longer serve as a 
source of religious freedom for those who most need the protection of 
the Constitution. When the decisions of the Supreme Court are 
combined with the reality of the political process, non-mainstream 
religions have very little protection unless provided by state 
constitutions or laws. 
II. FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 
A. CURRENT STATUS 
Whatever punch the free exercise clause had, it was lost when the 
Court decided Employment Division, Department of Human Resources 
of Oregon v. Smith4 in 1990. Very briefly, in Smith the Court 
substituted rational basis review for strict scrutiny when application of 
a neutral law of general applicability, such as the Oregon controlled 
substance law, is challenged as inconsistent with the free exercise 
clause. 5 Applying rational basis, the Court rejected the free exercise 
3. Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 1454 {2d ed., 
Aspen 2005). 
4. Empl. Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
5. Id. at 885. Instead of explicitly overruling Wis. v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235 
(1972), where it utilized strict scrutiny in holding that the state could not compel 
Amish children to attend school to age 16, the Court in Smith said Yoder can be 
distinguished as a "hybrid" case, i.e., one that includes a constitutional claim, such as 
parents' due process right to control the education of their children, which triggers 
strict scrutiny. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82. This interpretation is not obvious from the 
Court's opinion in Yoder. 406 U.S. at 214; see Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 
143-44 (2d Cir. 2003) (Smith's discussion of hybrid claims is dicta and not binding). 
Similarly, the attempt in Smith to distinguish the Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 
( 1963), line of cases as "stand[ing] for the proposition that where the State has in place 
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claims of two members ofthe Native American Church who were fired 
from their jobs because they ingested peyote at a religious ceremony. 
The two members were then found ineligible for unemployment 
compensation benefits. After Smith, the Court will apply strict scrutiny 
only where a law is actually aimed at a religious practice or belief,6 as 
in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,Inc. v. City of Hialeah.7 While 
Lukumi protects non-mainstream religions from governments that are 
"out to get them," and do so in a fairly unsophisticated manner,8 it may 
provide little protection where government is sophisticated enough to 
couch its hostility in religion-neutral terms. When the hostility or 
discrimination is couched in neutral terms, it may be difficult for the 
challenger to show that the regulation is really aimed at a particular 
religion.9 
Prior to Smith, based on decisions such as Sherbert v. Verner and 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, it was assumed that free exercise clause claims 
were subject to heightened scrutiny if government substantially 
burdened the exercise of religion. 10 Heightened scrutiny appeared to 
a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of 
'religious hardship' without compelling reason," is not convincing. Smith, 494 U.S. at 
884. 
6. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885. 
7. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
8. The free exercise clause is not necessary to address such outrageous situations 
because government action that is motivated only by an interest in "getting someone" 
is not rational and therefore should not survive a challenge under the due process or 
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Village of Willowbrook v. 
0/ech, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996). 
9. This is similar to the problem in equal protection cases after Washington v. 
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976), in which the Court held that the equal protection 
clause guards against only intentional discrimination, not neutral acts with a 
discriminatory impact. Therefore, after Davis, the equal protection plaintiff must show 
that the government acted "at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' [a 
regulation's] adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Personnel Adminstr. of 
Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). 
10. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220-21; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404. In Sherbert, the Court 
referred to the "pressure" on the employee to "forego" the "practice of her religion" as 
a result of her ineligibility for unemployment compensation benefits. 374 U.S. at 404. 
Later, in Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707,717-18 (1981), the 
Court noted how conditioning "receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed 
by a religious faith," or denying a "benefit because of conduct mandated by religious 
belief," places "substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to 
violate his beliefs," thus imposing a burden upon religion. Further, the Court 
recognized that "[ w ]hile the compulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free 
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govern cases where the burden was direct, i.e., the exercise of religion 
triggered a criminal or civil penalty, 11 as well as cases where the 
burden was indirect, i.e., the exercise of religion resulted in the 
forfeiture of a government benefit.12 However, even before Smith 
when strict scrutiny presumably governed free exercise clause claims, 
with the exception of the unemployment compensation cases, 13 such 
claims enjoyed only limited success. The Court usually based its 
rejection of these claims on either a fmding that the burden imposed on 
religion was not sufficient to trigger heightened scrutiny or a fmding 
that the §overnmental interest was sufficient to survive heightened 
scrutiny. 1 After Smith, non-mainstream religions cannot rely on the 
free exercise clause for protection, except when challenging 
unsophisticated government action that is susce~tible to a challenge 
based on Lukumi. 15 Presumably, this will be rare. 6 
In Locke v. Davey, the Court addressed the constitutionality of 
Washington's Promise Scholarship Program when challenged by a 
student whose state-funded scholarship was rescinded because he 
intended to pursue a devotional theology degree. 17 While allowing 
him to use the scholarship for this purpose would not violate the 
exercise is nonetheless substantial." !d. at 718. Thus, a burden, whether direct or 
indirect, is substantial if it discourages the exercise of religion by imposing substantial 
pressure on making decisions related to religion. 
11. See e.g. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218 (compulsory education law directly conflicted 
with Amish religious beliefs). 
12. See e.g. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404 (refusal to accept work on Saturday, as a 
result of religious beliefs, resulted in the denial of unemployment compensation 
benefits; "[g]overnmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden 
upon the free exercise of religion as would a fme imposed against appellant for her 
Saturday worship"). 
13. See Frazee v. Ill. Dept. of Empl. Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 833-35 (1989); Hobbie v. 
Unempl. Apps. Commn. of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 146 (1987); Thomas, 450 U.S. at 720; 
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 408-09. 
14. See e.g. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 
378, 398-99 (1990); Lyng v. N. W Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U.S. 439,447 
(1988); Bob Jones U. v. U.S. Goldsboro Christian Schs., Inc., 461 U.S. 574, 604 
(1983); U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982). 
15. Church of the Lukumi BabaluAye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,531-32 
(1993). 
16. If the "hybrid" cases, described in Smith, depend on a constitutional claim, other 
than free exercise, that triggers strict scrutiny, then the free exercise claim really adds 
nothing because strict scrutiny would be utilized without the free exercise claim. 
17. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 715, 717 (2004). 
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establishment clause, 18 the State's decision to not fund Davey's course 
of study was not governed by Lukumi, because Washington's "disfavor 
of religion (if it can be called that) is of a far milder kind" in that "[t]he 
State has merely chosen not to fund a distinct category of 
instruction."19 The Court recognized the tension between the two 
religion clauses, but found that this case involved the " 'play in the 
joints' "between the clauses.20 
By making it more difficult to prevail on a free exercise clause 
claim, the Court has adversely affected non-mainstream religions 
because mainstream religions generally can protect themselves in the 
political process.21 Justice Scalia recognized this in Smith: 
But to say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is 
permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is 
constitutionally required, and that the appropriate occasions for its 
creation can be discerned by the courts. It may fairly be said that 
leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a 
relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely 
engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic 
government must be preferred to a system in which each 
conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social 
importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious 
beliefs.22 
This leaves religious freedom for many in the hands of the 
political process, exactly where it would be if the religion clauses did 
not exist in the Bill of Rights. Like most protections found in the Bill 
of Rights, the religion clauses of the First Amendment are most 
important to those who cannot prevail in the political process?3 The 
18. /d. at 719. 
19. !d. at 720-21. 
20. !d. at 718-19 (quoting Walz v. Tax Commn. of N.YC., 397 U.S. 664, 669 
(1970)). 
21. Contra Gregory C. Sisk, How Traditional and Minority Religions Fare in the 
Courts: Empirical Evidence from Religious Liberty Cases, 76 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1021, 
1021 (2005) (where the author found erroneous the hypothesis that minority religions 
are more likely to lose, and Christian religions are more likely to win, religious liberty 
claims in federal courts). 
22. Empl. Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 
(1990). 
23. W Va. St. Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,638 (1943). The Court stated 
that "[t]he very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the 
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Court, as reflected in Justice Scalia's opinion in Smith, ignores the fact 
that the protections found in the Bill of Rights, as well as the 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, were deemed too 
important to leave to the political process. 24 Because mainstream 
religions generally have been successful in protecting their interests 
through the political process, 25 it is the non-mainstream religions that 
are adversely affected by Smith. In short, the Supreme Court has made 
it clear to such religions that they should not look to the First 
Amendment for religious freedom. 
Shortly after Smith, the Court made it difficult for Congress to 
provide statutory protection for non-mainstream religions, similar to 
the protection it was assumed they enjoyed under the free exercise 
clause prior to Smith. Congress reacted to Smith by passing the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), which provided a 
statutory free exercise claim to be governed by the strict scrutiny of 
Sherbert. 26 However, as noted above, RFRA was declared 
unconstitutional in City of Boerne. There, the Court determined that 
Congress lacked the power under section five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to pass a law "so out of proportion" to any remedial or 
preventive object fiven the narrow interpretation of the free exercise 
clause in Smith. 2 A more limited federal statute, the Religious 
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and 
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts." Id. 
24. Interestingly, when the political process responded to the decision in Smith, 
with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000), the 
Court declared the Act unconstitutional in City of Boerne. City of Boerne v. Flores, 
521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997). Congress, according to the Court, exceeded its legislative 
power under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 536. 
25. Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Smith, compared the use of peyote in the 
sacraments of the Native American Church to the sacramental use of wine by the 
Roman Catholic Church and noted that "the Federal Government exempted such use of 
wine from its general ban on possession and use of alcohol" in the National Prohibition 
Act. 494 U.S. at 914 n. 6 (emphasis omitted) (Blackmun, Brennan & Marshall, JJ., 
dissenting). Blackmun also stated that " [h]owever compelling the Government's then 
general interest in prohibiting the use of alcohol may have been, it could not plausibly 
have asserted an interest sufficiently compelling to outweigh Catholics' right to take 
communion." Id. (emphasis omitted). 
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb. 
27. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532. Courts of appeals have held that City of 
Boerne invalidated RFRA only as applied to state and local government, not the federal 
government. See e.g. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 141 F.3d 854, 
858-59 (8th Cir. 1998); Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1219-21 (9th Cir. 2002); 
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Exercise in Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 
(RLUIPA),28 was passed after City of Boerne based on Congress' 
legislative power under the spending and commerce clauses.29 Thus, 
religions without access to or influence in the political process may 
have to turn to religious freedom provisions in state constitutions. 
While the state courts are not bound by Smith in interpreting their 
own constitutions, that does not mean they will apply the strict scrutiny 
standard adopted in RFRA or any other standard more demanding than 
Smith. Reasonable people can differ on whether free exercise clause 
cases should be governed by rational basis, strict scrutiny, or something 
in between. It may be that the strict scrutin~ standard adopted in RFRA 
imposed too great a burden on government, 0 particularly in light of the 
religious diversity in our country today? 1 From the government's 
perspective, problems caused by application of strict scrutiny are 
exacerbated by the fact that the Court is reluctant to define "religion" 
as used in the First Amendment.32 A few decisions discuss the issue. 
Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr. , 192 F.3d 826, 831-34 (9th Cir. 1999); 
Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 958 ( lOth Cir. 2001). 
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000). 
29. In Cutter v. Wilkinson, the Court held that this Act does not violate the 
establishment clause insofar as it increases the religious rights of incarcerated persons. 
125 S. Ct. 2113, 2123-24 (2005). 
30. In Cutter, the Court recognized this concern, but indicated it had "no cause to 
believe that RLUIPA would not be applied in an appropriately balanced way, with 
particular sensitivity to security concerns." !d. at 2123 (emphasis added). 
31 . In his concurring opinion in Sch. Dist. of Abington Township, Pa. v. Schempp, 
Justice Brennan stated: 
[O]ur religious composition makes us a vastly more diverse people than were 
our forefathers. They knew differences chiefly among Protestant sects. 
Today the Nation is far more heterogeneous religiously, including as it does 
substantial minorities not only of Catholics and Jews but as well of those 
who worship according to no version of the Bible and those who worship no 
God at all. 
374 U.S. 203, 240 (1963) (Brennan J. , concurring). We are even more religiously 
diverse today than we were in 1963. 
32. The most extensive discussion of the meaning of "religion" is found in two 
statutory interpretation cases, Welsh v. U.S. , 398 U.S. 333, 335 (1970), and U.S. v. 
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 173-85 (1965), both addressing claims of conscientious objectors 
under the Universal Military Training and Service Act. The statutory definition of 
religion was expanded, with the Court stating that "[a] sincere and meaningful belief 
which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of 
those admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within the statutory definition." 
Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176; see also Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678,680, 681-82 
(7th Cir. 2005) (In addressing a free exercise clause claim by an inmate challenging the 
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In Yoder, the Court said it had to distinguish between faith and 
mode of life, indicating the latter may not be "interposed as a barrier to 
reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on purely secular 
considerations," because "to have the protection of the Religion 
Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief."33 "[R]ejection 
of the contemporary secular values accepted by the majority" as a 
"philosophical and personal" choice, rather than religious, "would not 
rest on a religious basis."34 The Court concluded that "the traditional 
way of life of the Amish is not merely a matter of personal preference, 
but one of deep religious conviction, shared by an organized group, and 
intimately related to daily living."35 Later, in Frazee, the Court 
clarified Yoder by holding that the support of an "organized religious 
denomination" is not necessary, and by protecting an individual's 
observance of the Sunday Sabbath even though he arrived at his belief 
from his interpretation of the Bible rather than basing it on the tenet or 
teaching of an organized church or religious body. 36 
The absence of a clear definition of religion, combined with the 
fact that sincerely held beliefs that the believer claims are religious, 
generally will be treated as "religion" for purposes of applying the free 
exercise clause,37 invites claims that may be perceived as people 
prison's refusal to give him permission to start a study group for atheist inmates, the 
court said "we have suggested in the past that when a person sincerely holds beliefs 
dealing with issues of 'ultimate concern' that for her occupy a ' place parallel to that 
filled by ... God in traditionally religious persons,' those beliefs represent her religion. 
. . . We have already indicated that atheism may be considered, in this specialized 
sense, a religion."). 
33. Wis. v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,215 (1972). 
34. !d. at 216. 
35. !d. 
36. Frazee v. Ill. Dept. of Empl. Sec. , 489 U.S. 829, 833-35 (1989) (indicating 
"[s]tates are clearly entitled to assure themselves that there is an ample predicate for 
invoking the [f]ree [e]xercise [c]lause"; Frazee' s refusal to work on Sunday was based 
on a "sincerely held religious belief[]"); cf Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Empl. Sec. Div. , 
450 U.S. 707, 715-16 ( 1981) (While the state argued that Thomas' faith did not 
preclude him from working in the armaments plant making tank turrets, because other 
Jehovah's Witnesses worked in the plant and there was evidence that it was " 
' scripturally' acceptable," the Court held it was beyond the judicial function and 
competence to examine whether Thomas or others more correctly understood the 
commands of their faith.). 
37. See e.g. US. v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-88 (1944) (holding the trial court 
properly withheld from the jury questions concerning the truth or falsity of the 
religious beliefs or doctrines of the individuals accused). 
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seeking "a law unto [themselves]."38 It is understandable why the 
Court wants to stay out of the business of defining religion, however, 
the current approach, under which only the sincerity of a claimed 
religious belief is questioned, may have pushed the Court toward the 
use of rational basis review because any heightened standard of review 
would unduly hamper government.39 For the large number of cases 
governed by Smith, use of the rational basis standard of review means 
most of the free exercise clause claims will be unsuccessful. 
B. REVIVING THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 
Utilization of an intermediate standard of review, pursuant to 
which government would have to show that the challenged regulation 
substantially serves an important governmental interest, along with 
some guidelines for determining what constitutes religion, would 
restore some meaning to the free exercise clause. There are several 
sources of intermediate scrutiny analysis from which the Court could 
borrow, including cases addressing sex discrimination claims based on 
the equal protection clause40 and, maybe more analogous, cases 
addressing a First Amendment challenge to a content-neutral regulation 
of speech.41 In free speech cases, intermediate scrutiny is utilized 
when government regulates the time, place, or manner of speech,42 as 
38. Empl. Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 
(1990). 
39. Ironically, what appears to be a religion-friendly refusal to have the courts 
involved in determining the meaning of "religion," may actually dilute the protection 
provided by the free exercise clause. 
40. See e.g. U.S. v. Va., 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996); Miss. U. for Women v. 
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (government must show an" 'exceedingly persuasive 
justification' " for a sex-based classification) (emphasis omitted); Craig v. Boren, 429 
U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (classifications based on gender "must serve important 
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to [the] achievement of those 
objectives"); compare Nguyen v. Jmmig. & Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53, 73 
(200 I) (upholding disfavored treatment of citizen fathers, compared to citizen mothers, 
when determining the citizenship of children born to unmarried parents, one a citizen 
and the other a non-citizen). 
41 . This raises a more basic question- whether future free exercise claims should 
be cast as freedom of expression or association claims, or at least as free exercise plus 
freedom of expression/association claims, as in Yoder. Wis. v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 
235-36 (1972). 
42. See e.g. Hill v. Colo., 530 U.S. 703, 725-26 (2000) (If a content-neutral 
regulation "does not entirely foreclose any means of communication, it may satisfy the 
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well as when government regulates expressive conduct.43 The 
intermediate standard utilized in such free speech cases can be adapted 
to analyze free exercise cases.44 First, the regulation affecting religion 
must be justified without reference to the religious activity, i.e., the 
regulation is religion neutra1.45 Any regulation that is aimed at 
religion, either generally or specifically, should trigger strict scrutiny 
based on Lukumi. 46 Second, the regulation should further a significant 
or substantial governmental interest in its application to religious 
activity. For example, the government should be required to show that 
a generally applicable law (like Oregon's controlled substance law at 
issue in Smith) applied to religious activity (like the sacramental use of 
peyote at a ceremony of the Native American Church) furthers a 
substantial governmental interest.47 In effect, the question is whether 
government has a substantial interest in refusing an exemption for 
Native American religious services.48 Justice Blackmun, in his dissent 
tailoring requirement even though it is not the least restrictive ... means .... ") 
(emphasis omitted). 
43. See e.g. U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) ("[A] government 
regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the 
Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the 
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the 
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is 
essential to the furtherance of that interest."); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (suggesting there is little, if any, difference in the 
standard governing these two types of cases; the key is that the regulation is "justified 
without reference to the content of the regulated speech," it is narrowly drawn or 
tailored, it furthers a substantial or significant government interest, and it leaves "open 
ample alternative channels for communication of the information"). 
44. Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion in Smith, argued for a case-by-case 
approach similar to that u ed in free speech cases. Empl. Div., Dept. of Human 
Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 902 (1990) (O'Connor, Brennan, Marshall & 
Blackmun, JJ., joining as to parts I-II, and concurring in the judgment). 
45. Clark, 468 U.S. at 293. 
46. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32 
(1993). 
47. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 921 (Biackmun, Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting) 
("Oregon's interest in enforcing its drug laws against religious use of peyote is not 
sufficiently compelling to outweigh respondents' right to the free exercise of their 
religion." (emphasis omitted)). Applying intermediate scrutiny, the question would be 
whether Oregon's interest is sufficiently substantial. 
48. As with other exemptions, this demonstrates the tension between the two 
religion clauses, i.e., would an exemption for religious services raise an establishment 
clause concern? 
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in Smith, said the State offers "no evidence that the religious use of 
peyote has ever harmed anyone."49 Third, the regulation must be 
narrowly drawn or tailored to further the government's interest in 
applying the law to religious activity.50 Assuming government can 
show a substantial interest in application of its regulation to religious 
activity, it must also show that the burden on the religious activity is no 
greater than necessary to achieve that interest.51 Fourth, the Court 
should examine the availability of alternative channels for religious 
activity.52 This inquiry resembles the threshold question in free 
exercise cases, i.e., whether the exercise of religion is substantially 
burdened. It also begins to ask how central the prohibited activity is to 
the religious belief asserted. For example, the use of peyote may be 
more central to the religious ceremony of Native Americans than 
refraining from producing armaments was to Jehovah's Witnesses. 53 
Subjecting religious freedom claims based on the free exercise 
clause to intermediate scrutiny would allow the courts more flexibility 
in evaluating government's interests than strict scrutiny allows; 
however, such heightened scrutiny would require government to 
affirmatively show that it has a substantial interest, instead of simply 
articulating a legitimate interest as required by rational basis review. 
Such an approach takes religious freedom seriously, but recognizes that 
it can be difficult for government to operate if it needs a compelling 
justification whenever it interferes with one or more of the many and 
diverse religious practices in this country. Obviously, the more diverse 
the religious beliefs and practices, the more likely it is that a religion-
neutral law of general applicability will conflict with a religious 
practice. 
Another way to reduce the impact of the free exercise clause on 
government, while retaining some meaning, is to defme more narrowly 
49. Smith, 494 U.S. at 911-12 (footnote omitted) (Blackmun, Brennan & Marshall, 
JJ., dissenting). However, in her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor said the state 
has a compelling interest in the uniform application of its law, as reflected in its 
"judgment that the possession and use of controlled substances, even by only one 
person, is inherently harmful and dangerous." !d. at 905 (O'Connor, Brennan, 
Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., joining as to parts I-II, and concurring in the judgment). 
50. Clark, 468 U.S at 293. 
51. !d. 
52. !d. 
53. Compare Smith, 494 U.S. at 874 with Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Empl. Sec. 
Div., 450 U.S. 707,709 (1981). 
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what constitutes religion for First Amendment purposes. Too broad a 
definition of religion tends to dilute protection for everyone; on the 
other hand, having the courts decide what constitutes a religious belief, 
aside from causing entanglement problems, also disfavors non-
mainstream religions. Nevertheless, some narrowing of what 
constitutes a religion fitting within the protection of the free exercise 
clause might result in greater religious freedom. For example, the 
Supreme Court could create a presumption that one claiming 
governmental interference with religion fits within the scope of the free 
exercise clause, with the burden on government to rebut the 
presumption. While this may offend the principle that the courts 
should avoid deciding the legitimacy of one's religion, the need to 
make this determination is implicit in the religion clauses. In fact, 
because the religion clauses protect "religion," it seems implausible 
that the clauses could be meaningful without a definition of "religion," 
or a definition that includes anything one asserts is a religion. Even if 
it is offensive to religions to have the courts decide the meaning of a 
term in the Constitution, it is less offensive than having the courts 
interpret the free exercise clause in a manner that provides no 
meaningful protection to religion. Of course, any determination made 
by the courts would affect only the litigation in which the issue arises. 
So, for example, a determination in Thomas that producing armaments 
does not conflict with Mr. Thomas' religion would not have bound 
either Jehovah's Witnesses in general, or Mr. Thomas specifically, with 
regard to their religious beliefs, except in the context of an application 
for unemployment compensation benefits after a discharge or voluntary 
resignation because of a work assignment. 54 The point is simply that 
the trade off, the use of intermediate scrutiny with a limitation on the 
meaning of religion, will result in greater religious freedom than the 
post-Smith version of the free exercise clause. 
As an alternative to intermediate scrutin{', the use of a balancing 
approach would expand religious freedom. 5 This would allow the 
courts to consider a number of factors, including the extent of the 
burden on religious freedom, whether the individual is forced to choose 
between a government benefit and violating a tenet of her religion, the 
54. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 720. 
55. To some extent, application of intermediate scrutiny requires balancing of 
governmental and individual interests but it is not a true balancing since the process is 
somewhat tilted in favor of the individual. 
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uniformity of members' interpretation of the religious doctrine, the 
government interest in its rule, and the extent of the burden on 
government caused by accommodation of the religious practice. 56 As 
to the latter, the number of individuals adhering to the challenger's 
religion or religious beliefs could be a factor in assessing the 
government's justification for infringing upon the religious practice at 
issue. Of course, this leaves non-mainstream religions at a 
disadvantage, when compared to mainstream reli~ions, but this is true 
even if the Court says it is applying strict scrutiny. 7 
In short, there is a reasonable position between Smith and RFRA 
that would ~romote religious freedom without unduly hampering 
government. This would revive the free exercise clause and allow it 
to play at least a limited role as a co-guarantor of religious freedom. Its 
role would be limited because, prior to Smith, when the standard for 
free exercise clause claims was supposedly strict scrutiny, few cases 
were successful in the Supreme Court, at least since 1960.59 Most of 
the limited success was achieved in the unemployment cases, where the 
burden on J5overnment, i.e., payment of benefits, was rather 
insignificant. In essence, the decision in Smith placed the legal 
standard for free exercise clause jurisprudence in conformity with the 
pre-Smith results. This history of an ineffective free exercise clause 
may be difficult to overcome, even if the legal standard is modified as 
56. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 883, 885. 
57. Those on the "outside" are always at a disadvantage; for example, it is not a 
coincidence that pro-government speakers rarely have to resort to the First Amendment 
for protection. 
58. Religious freedom claims relying on the free exercise clause do not have to be 
an all (RFRA) or nothing (Smith) proposition. With a case-by-case analysis, a court 
could reasonably distinguish between the following situations: (I) A Native American 
fired by the state because of a positive drug test resulting from the sacramental use of 
peyote at a religious ceremony, and (2) an individual fired by the state because of a 
positive drug test resulting from the use of marijuana at a "religious" ceremony based 
on twenty-five college students' sincerely held belief that a joint helps them better 
understand the mystery of the Trinity. 
59. See e.g. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization. of Cal., 493 U.S. 
378, 398-99 (1990); Lyng v. N. W. Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U.S. 439, 447 
(1988); Bob Jones U. v. U.S. Goldsboro Christian Schs., Inc., 461 U.S. 574, 604 
(1983); U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,260 (1982). 
60. See e.g. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409-10 (1963); see also Frazee v. Ill. 
Dept. of Empl. Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 835 (1989); Hobbie v. Unempl. Apps. Commn. of 
Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 146 (1987); Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 
707,718-20 (1981). 
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suggested, because the voice of those who need the protection of the 
clause is often ineffective in both the political branches and the judicial 
branch. However, the modified standard would allow the Supreme 
Court to rule in favor of a plaintiff without the fear that such a decision 
would strengthen the presumption of unconstitutionality under strict 
scrutiny review. 
III. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
The Court's interpretation of the establishment clause compounds 
the effect of a limiting interpretation of the free exercise clause. With a 
few exceptions, it appears the Court will rarely find a violation of the 
establishment clause. Based on the decision in County of Allegheny v. 
American Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter,61 there is 
some constitutional limit on government displays of religious 
symbols.62 However, government can circumvent quite easily the 
holding that the creche display was unconstitutional by simply 
avoiding religious displays that stand alone, i.e., make sure the message 
is not exclusively religious.63 More recently, the Court's Ten 
Commandments decisions demonstrate that government will be 
allowed to display religious symbols as long as it is a bit careful.64 
Based on these two decisions, it appears a majority of the Justices will 
allow a display of the Ten Commandments that has a secular purpose, 
particularly if their historical meaning is apparent from the context of 
61. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). The creche display was 
unconstitutional because, unlike the menorah, there was nothing in the display (the 
creche stood alone) to detract from its religious message. Jd. at 598, 621. 
62. See also Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1284, 1297 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that the display of the Ten Commandments as the centerpiece of the rotunda 
in the Alabama State Judicial Building fails both the purpose and effects prongs of the 
Lemon test). 
63. See e.g. Freethought Socy. of Greater Phi/a. v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 
266 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that the county commissioners' refusal to remove a plaque, 
placed on the fa9ade of the courthouse in 1920, displaying the Ten Commandments did 
not violate the establishment clause because of its historical context). 
64. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2858 (2005) (without a majority opinion, 
the Court allows the display of a monument inscribed with the Ten Commandments on 
the Texas State Capitol grounds, among seventeen monuments and twenty-one 
historical markers, that had been there for forty years (plurality)); but see McCreary 
County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2739-40 (2005) (counties' displays on the walls of 
their courthouses are unconstitutional because of their predominantly religious 
purpose). 
2005 DEMISE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 429 
the display.65 Aside from the minor restrictions on government 
displays of religious symbols, only the school-sponsored IJrayer cases, 
most recently Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doi6 and Lee v. 
Weisman,67 suggest the establishment clause still imposes any 
meaningful restriction on government.68 In the important area of 
government financial aid to religion, the barrier imposed by the 
establishment clause is slight, at best. 
It is useful to divide the various types of financial aid into two 
broad categories, direct and indirect, with the former going directly 
from government to the religious institution and the latter going 
initially to private individuals who direct it to the religious institution. 
After the decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, upholding a school 
voucher program, 69 there is virtually no establishment clause check on 
indirect fmancial aid to religious institutions. Stating that the Court's 
"jurisprudence with respect to true private choice programs has 
remained consistent and unbroken,"70 the Court said it is: 
clear that where a government aid program is neutral with respect 
to religion, and provides assistance directly to a broad class of 
citizens who, in tum, direct government aid to religious schools 
wholly as a result of their own genuine and independent private 
65. Justice Breyer, who provided the crucial fifth vote in Van Orden, found it to be 
a "borderline" case but was persuaded that the state intended the tablets' secular 
message to predominate and the forty-year history showed that this had been the 
monument's effect. 125 S. Ct. at 2869-70 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
66. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 315-16 (2000) (prayers before 
varsity football games). 
67. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,580,587 (1992) (prayers as part of middle and 
high school graduation ceremonies). 
68. The establishment clause is still a factor when government facially 
discriminates among religions, as in Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 
687, 696 (1994), and Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 255 (1982). Presumably, such 
obvious discrimination would violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, so the establishment clause is not necessary to address it. However, if 
government becomes more sophisticated in its discrimination by adopting religion-
neutral rules with a discriminatory impact on certain religions, then it may be able to 
avoid both the religion clauses and the equal protection clause. 
69. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662-63 (2002). 
70. !d. at 649. The Court referred to three cases involving "true private choice" 
programs: Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. I, 12-14 (1993); Witters 
v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 489-90 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 
463 U.S. 388, 403 (1983). 
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choice, the program is not readily subject to challenge under the 
[ e ]stablishment [ c ]lause. 71 
The Court dismissed what it described as the "incidental 
advancement of a religious mission, or the perceived endorsement of a 
religious message," as "reasonably attributable to the individual aid 
recipients, not the government, whose role ends with the disbursement 
of benefits.',n Theoretically, parents could "spend" the vouchers at 
public schools, private nonreligious schools or private religious 
schools, however, none of the public schools in adjacent districts 
participated and forty-six of the fifty-six private schools participating 
had a religious affiliation. Over ninety-six percent of all voucher 
recipients attended religious schools, including "schools that can fairly 
be characterized as founded to teach religious doctrine and to imbue 
teaching in all subjects with a religious dimension.''73 Thus, it now 
appears that government aid to religious institutions will not violate the 
establishment clause as long as there is a secular purpose, the program 
is neutral with respect to religion, i.e., it is available to both religious 
and nonreligious institutions, and the assistance is provided "directly to 
a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct [the] government aid to 
religious [institutions] whol~ as a result of their own genuine and 
independent private choice." 4 In short, any "indirect" aid is likely to 
be upheld, even though most of the aid goes to institutions that are 
"pervasively sectarian," and it is used to subsidize religious instruction 
and proselytizing. 
The most recent case addressing direct aid is Mitchell v. Helms, in 
which a four-justice plurality, with Justices O'Connor and Breyer 
concurring in the judgment, noted the distinction between direct and 
indirect aid but found it of little significance because there was still 
private choice, i.e., in a per capita school aid program the aid reaches 
religious schools by virtue of the fact that parents made the choice to 
send their children to a private religious school.75 As in Zelman, the 
71. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652. 
72. !d. at 640, 652. 
73. !d. at 687 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). 
74. !d. at 652 (majority). 
75. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 816 (2000) (plurality). In Helms, the federal 
program at issue provides for federal distribution of funds to state and local 
governmental agencies; those agencies "lend educational materials and equipment to 
public and private schools, with the enrollment of each participating school 
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aid at issue in Helms could go to schools that are "pervasively 
sectarian," and therefore would be used to subsidize religious education 
and proselytizing.76 Justice O'Connor, joined by Breyer, wrote 
separately because "the plurality announce[ d) a rule of unprecedented 
breadth for the evaluation of [ e ~tablishrnent [ c ]lause challenges to 
government school aid programs." 7 She stated: 
Reduced to its essentials, the plurality's rule states that 
government aid to religious schools does not have the effect of 
advancing religion so long as the aid is offered on a neutral basis 
and the aid is secular in content. The plurality also rejects the 
distinction between direct and indirect aid, and holds that the 
actual diversion of secular aid by a religious school to the 
advancement of its religious mission is permissible. 78 
She was particularly troubled by two aspects of the plurality 
opinion: Its "treatment of neutrality comes close to assigning that 
factor singular importance" and its "approval of actual diversion of 
government aid to religious indoctrination."79 Nevertheless, she 
concurred in the judgment because the program at issue in Helms was 
very similar to the program at issue in Agostini v Felton:80 
[The] aid is allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria; the 
aid must be supplementary and cannot supplant non-Federal 
funds; no [federal] funds ever reach the coffers of religious 
schools; the aid must be secular; any evidence of actual diversion 
is de minimis; and the program includes adequate safeguards.81 
Financial support of the religious work of religious institutions 
seems to be the most egregious government "establishment" of 
religion, yet the Court appears willing to uphold nearly any 
government program providing such support. 82 Once that barrier is 
determining the amount of aid that it receives." !d. at 801 (plurality). In her 
concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor indicated this is not a "true private-choice 
program," and also noted that the difference between the two "is significant for 
purposes of endorsement." !d. at 842 (O'Connor & Breyer, JJ., concurring). 
76. !d. at 826-29 (plurality). 
77. !d. at 837 (O'Connor & Breyer JJ., concurring). 
78. Id. 
79. !d. 
80. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (Title I program). 
81. Helms, 530 U.S. at 867 (O'Connor & Breyer, JJ. , concurring). 
82. While most Supreme Court cases address financial aid to schools, a facial 
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broken, the establishment clause means little. Government can 
subsidize the religious work of religious institutions by choosing to 
fund services provided by both secular and religious institutions, even 
though the religious institutions' religious work pervades the secular 
work. Worse, government can effectively favor certain religions by 
choosing to fund only those services provided primarily by "favored" 
religions. Such disguised discrimination, when based on race or sex, is 
insulated from the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment by the Washington v. Davis83 line of cases, unless the 
challenger can prove intentional discrimination, and it appears 
disguised religious discrimination will survive First Amendment 
scrutiny. 
When the government is allowed to pay for religious instruction 
and proselytizing, the establishment clause provides very little 
protection against government support of religion. Clearly there is no 
longer" 'a wall of separation between Church and State' ";84 a more 
appropriate metaphor would be a "growing partnership" between 
church and state. The wall had been substantially eroded before 
Zelman and Helms, because the Court held in several cases that 
religious speakers cannot be excluded when government decides to 
make available funds and facilities for speech. 85 In each of these cases, 
the Court held that allowing the religious groups and speakers to 
participate in the ~overnment subsidy would not offend the 
establishment clause. 6 Therefore, as a result of these cases, if 
government chooses to subsidize speech, it cannot exclude institutions 
challenge to the Adolescent Family Life Act, which authorized grants to organizations, 
including religious organizations, to provide counseling and care to pregnant 
adolescents and their parents, was rejected in Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 593, 
618 (1988). 
83. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
84. Everson v. Bd. ofEduc. of Ewing TP., 330 U.S. I, 16 (1947) (citing Reynolds v. 
U.S., 98 u.s. 145, 164 (1878). 
85. See e.g. Good News Club v. Milford C. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112 (2001); 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors ofU. ofVa., 515 U.S. 819,845-46 (1995); Capitol 
Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 769 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v. 
Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist. , 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993); Bd. of Educ. of 
Westside Community Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 253 (1990); Widmar v. Vincent, 
454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (These decisions are based on the free speech clause of the 
First Amendment.). 
86. See id. 
2005 DEMISE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 433 
or individuals who will use the subsidy to promote religion;87 if 
government chooses to subsidize education, and presumably social 
services, it is allowed to make the funds available to religious 
institutions, even those that are pervasively sectarian, so long as the 
funds get to the religious institution as a result of some private choice 
by the beneficiaries. The fact that the service being purchased by the 
government will be provided in conjunction with religious instruction 
and proselytizing does not, according to the Court, invalidate the 
subsidy. 
While both Zelman and Helms involved government aid to 
schools, the rationale appears broad enough to encompass the current 
administration's "Faith-based and Community Initiatives,"88 pursuant 
to which federal funds are available to a variety of religious institutions 
providing social services. 89 Although Congress appears to have 
misgivings about the administration's faith-based initiatives,90 today 
there appears to be considerable support in society for government 
subsidy of religion. This support can be traced to the fact that 
mainstream religions are the primary beneficiaries of such programs, 
87. In Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. ofN. YC., 331 F.3d 342, 350, 354-
55 (2d Cir. 2003), the plaintiff church's request to rent space in a school was denied 
pursuant to a board of education policy that prohibits " 'religious services or religious 
instruction' " in school facilities. Based on Good News Club, the trial court issued a 
preliminary injunction and this was affirmed on appeal. Id. at 353. In discussing Good 
News Club and whether teaching moral values is different than religious worship, the 
court indicated it may not be "able to identify a form of religious worship that is 
divorced from the teaching of moral values." Id. at 355. The court suggested that after 
Good News Club, it may not be possible to exclude religious worship from a 
government facility opened for private speech. I d. 
88. See Exec. Or. 13280, 67 Fed. Reg. 77145, 77145-46 (Dec. 12, 2002); Exec. Or. 
13279, 67 Fed. Reg. 77141, 77141-44 (Dec. 12, 2002); Exec. Or. 13199, 66 Fed. Reg. 
8499, 8499-8500 (Jan. 29, 2001); Exec. Or. 13198, 66 Fed. Reg. 8497, 8497-98 (Jan. 
29, 2001); see also Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. McCallum, 324 F.3d 880, 
882 (7th Cir. 2003) (rejecting an establishment clause challenge to Wisconsin's 
funding of a halfway house that incorporates Christianity into its treatment program, 
based on Zelman, even though the state agency dispensed with the vouchers and paid 
the provider directly after the recipient selected the provider). 
89. Jill Goldenziel, Administratively Quirky, Constitutionally Murky: The Bush 
Faith-Based Initiative, 8 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Policy 359, 360 (2005). 
90. See e.g. Mike Allen & Alan Cooperman, Bush Backs Religious Charities on 
Hiring: Hill Is Urged to Ease Bias Rules on Groups That Get U.S. Funds, 202 Wash. 
Post AI, A4 (June 25, 2003); Dana Milbank, Bush Legislative Approach Failed in 
Faith Bill Battle: White House Is Faulted for Not Building a Consensus in Congress, 
139 Wash. Post A1, Al4 (Apr. 23, 2003). 
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because they tend to be the religions that have branched out into 
providing education and social services.91 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As a result of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the religion 
clauses, the non-mainstream religions lose under both the free exercise 
clause and the establishment clause; religion-neutral, generally 
applicable laws are much more likely to interfere with the practices of 
non-mainstream religions, due to their lack of representation and clout 
in the political process, and mainstream religions are much more likely 
to benefit from government subsidies because of their representation 
and clout in the political process.92 Members of non-mainstream 
religions must feel like "outsiders" when they observe government 
practices and regulations hindering their religious practices while at the 
same time observing government subsidizing mainstream religions. 
This is precisely what the religion clauses were supposed to guard 
against. But, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, neither of the 
religion clauses promotes religious freedom and, as a result, 
government is free to prefer and subsidize mainstream religions. 
91 . A legitimate question is whether there would be such political support for 
government subsidies of religious institutions if more non-mainstream religions were in 
the business of providing education and social services, thus making them eligible for 
the subsidies. 
92. This does not mean that all members of mainstream religions support what is 
happening; fortunately, enlightened members of mainstream religions understand the 
danger of diluting the free exercise clause, as well as the danger of government subsidy 
of religion. They realize that without constitutionally protected religious freedom, their 
religions may one day fall into disfavor in the political process. This is demonstrated 
by, for example, the support of the U.S. Catholic Conference and National Conference 
of Catholic Bishops for RFRA when it was under consideration in Congress. See Sen. 
Jud. Comm., The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1992: Hearing on S. 2969, 
102d Cong. 99-115 (Sept. 18, 1992) (statement of Mark E. Chopko, legal advisor to the 
Nation's Roman Catholic Bishops); H.R. Subcomm. on Civ. & Constitutional Rights of 
the Comm. on Jud., The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991: Hearings on HR. 
2797, 102d Cong. 33-47 (May 13-14, 1992) (statement of Mark E. Chopko, legal 
advisor to the Nation's Roman Catholic Bishops). 
